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Abstract. The “Boyd”, also known as the “OODA loop” models the cyclic de-
cision processes of individuals and organisations in a variety of adversarial sit-
uations. Combined with the Kuramoto model, which provides a mathematical
foundation for describing the behaviour of a set of coupled or networked oscil-
lators, the Boyd-Kuramoto model captures strategic (cyclic) decision making in
competitive environments.
This paper presents a novel game-theoretic approach to the Boyd-Kuramoto dy-
namical model in complex and networked systems. A two-player, Red versus
Blue, strategic (non-cooperative) game is defined to describe the competitive in-
teractions and individual decision cycles of Red and Blue agent populations. We
study the model analytically in the regime of near phase synchrony where lin-
earisation approximations are possible. We find that we can solve for the Nash
equilibrium of the game in closed form, and that it only depends on the parame-
ters defining the fixed point of the dynamical system. A detailed numerical anal-
ysis of the finite version of the game investigates the behaviour of the underlying
networked Kuramoto oscillators and yields a unique, dominant Nash equilibrium
solution. The obtained Nash equilibrium is further studied analytically in a region
where the underlying Boyd-Kuramoto dynamics are stable. The result suggests
that only the fixed point of the dynamical system plays a role, consist with the
analytical solution. Finally, the impact of other variations of the Boyd-Kuramoto
parameters on the game outcomes are studied numerically, confirming the obser-
vations from fixed point approaches. It is observed that many parameters of the
Kuramoto model affect the NE solution of the current game formulation much
less than initially stipulated, arguably due to the time-scale separation between
the underlying Kuramoto model and the static game formulation.
1 Introduction
The Boyd or OODA loop is a cyclic decision process consisting of the following four
stages: Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act [4]. It models the decision cycle of individuals
and organisations in a variety of adversarial and competitive situations. It is a well-
known concept in business, litigation, and law enforcement. For example, the model can
be used to capture the competition (for a pool of customers) between two companies
in their innovation cycles as they bring new products to the market. The OODA loop is
also used widely in military strategy, and operational Command and Control (C2), far
from the air-to-air combat context in which it was originally derived.
The OODA loop matches the fundamental paradigms of system and control theory.
The “Observe” stage involves making observations about the environment and collect-
ing data by an Observer. The “Orient” stage may process the observed information in
light of the identified models and past experiences. In the “Decide” stage, available
actions are evaluated based on some performance criteria derived from utility, opti-
misation, or game theories. “Orient” and “Decide” can be mapped to a Controller in
control theory. Finally, an action is taken in the “Act” stage, which corresponds to the
behaviour of Actuators in systems. A similar analogy can also be made to strategic
decision making by companies or organisations. Competitive firms observe the market
trends and orient themselves accordingly; decide on their strategic investments, e.g. for
innovation; and act to bring new products and services to the market to get a higher
share.
The Kuramoto model [9] provides a mathematical foundation for describing the
behaviour of a set of coupled or networked oscillators and their synchronisation char-
acteristics. In this context, each oscillator corresponds to the decision cycle of an indi-
vidual or part of an organisation. The Kuramoto model has been widely used to analyse
complex systems in a variety of domains [1]. A novel application of Kuramoto oscil-
lators to Boyd-OODA cycles in adversarial interactions between two populations, e.g.
Red versus Blue, has been investigated in [7]. Specifically, the internal synchronisa-
tion of individual OODA oscillators within the (Red and Blue) populations as well as
the average phase difference (“lags” or frustrations) between the populations have been
studied in detail [6]. Such a model is an application of certain multi-graph frustrated
generalisation of the Kuramoto model, as studied in works such as [5]. This combined
Boyd-Kuramoto model is immediately applicable to competitive decisions as it captures
the complex cyclic decision processes in adversarial populations of networked hetero-
geneous agents. Going back to the example of two competitive firms, the average phase
difference may represent how much ahead one firm is against the other in the innovation
cycle.
Game Theory studies multi-agent decision making with versatile quantitative meth-
ods. As a special case, security games have been used to successfully model the decision
processes in adversarial situations [2]. The inherently adversarial nature of the interac-
tion between Blue and Red populations in commercial competition or strategic C2 deci-
sion making immediately motivates a game-theoretic approach to the Boyd-Kuramoto
model.
This paper applies the mathematical and conceptual framework of security games
to the Boyd-Kuramoto model of networked decision cycles (oscillators) in Blue and
Red populations within the adversarial/competitive context. As a starting point, a novel
Boyd-Kuramoto Game is introduced. In this 2-Player, nonzero-sum strategic (non-cooperative)
game, the Blue and Red players aim to gain a phase (lag) advantage over their opponent
based on the average phase of their own agent populations, while achieving internal
synchronisation of their Boyd-OODA oscillators. Kuramoto’s order parameters of the
player populations and the average phase difference between them provide the main cri-
Fig. 1: A conceptual diagram of the Boyd-Kuramoto Game.
teria in modelling the player utility functions. This three-layer Boyd-Kuramoto Game
model (Figure 1) is the first of its kind to the best knowledge of the authors.
The contributions of this paper include:
– Development of a novel game-theoretic model of Boyd-Kuramoto networked os-
cillators in complex C2 systems, which describes the strategic decision-making
processes of Red vs Blue populations.
– A detailed numerical analysis of the game investigating the stable behaviour of the
underlying networked Kuramoto oscillators, and computing the Nash Equilibrium
solutions.
– A numerical study of the impact of Boyd-Kuramoto parameters on the game out-
comes.
– An analytic description of the Nash Equilibrium solution after linearisation of the
dynamical equations.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The next section presents the main
components of the Boyd-Kuramoto Model. Section 3 introduces a specific game-theoretic
formulation. A numerical analysis of the game is presented in Section 4. The sensitivity
of the game solutions to various parameters is discussed in Section 6. Analytic solution
is pursued in Section 5. The paper concludes with remarks and a discussion on future
directions in Section 7.
2 Boyd-Kuramoto Model for Complex Competitive Systems
We consider a deterministic Blue versus Red networked Kuramoto oscillator model to
describe complex, adversarial, and competitive interactions using Boyd (OODA) cycles
in both Blue and Red agent populations. Let B = {1, . . . , N} and R = {1, . . . ,M}
be the respective sets of Blue and Red Agents. Each Blue Agent i ∈ B has a frequency
ωi and phase βi, and similarly each Red Agent j ∈ R has frequency νj and phase ρj .
The Blue Agents are connected to each other symmetrically (which may be relaxed)
via the N × N adjacency matrix B and Red Agents via the M ×M matrix R. The
N ×M matrix A represents the unidirectional external links from Blue to Red Agents.
Figure 1 visualises one possible configuration. Finally, the ζB , ζR, ζBR, and ζRB , are
the relevant coupling constants. The resulting Boyd-Kuramoto model is
dβi
dt
= ωi − ζB
∑
j∈B
Bij sin(βi − βj)− ζBR
∑
j∈R
Aij sin(βi − ρj − φ), i ∈ B (1)
dρi
dt
= νi − ζR
∑
i∈R
Rij sin(ρi − ρj)− ζRB
∑
j∈B
ATij sin(ρi − βj − ψ), i ∈ R, (2)
where d/dt is the time derivative, (·)T is the transpose operator, and φ and ψ are the
phase lags (frustrations) [8]. These two phase parameters capture the essence of Boyd’s
proposal that advantage is gained by one side over the other insofar as the coupled
dynamics enable the realisation of one side being ahead of the other by the desired
amount: φ for Blue, and ψ for Red.
In general, the set of nonlinear equations (1) can only be solved numerically and












be the respective centroids of the Blue and Red Agents’ phases. If the respective popu-
lations are phase locked internally, i.e. βi ≈ βj , ∀i, j ∈ B and ρi ≈ ρj , ∀i, j ∈ R, then
the difference between the centroids can be defined in a time-invariant manner
∆ := CB − CR, (4)
where CB and CR are defined in (3). Having a time-invariant, non-zero ∆ can be inter-
preted as external phase locking between populations. Finally, the degree of synchroni-
















The adversarial nature of the Blue versus Red interaction and the associated strategic
decisions immediately motivate a game-theoretic perspective to the Boyd-Kuramoto
model presented in the previous section. Given the novelty of combining game theory
with the Boyd-Kuramoto model and as a starting point, a static, 2-Player, nonzero-sum,
strategic (non-cooperative) game [3] is formulated next.
The two players of the game constitute the player set P := {Red,Blue} represent-
ing the respective set of networked agent populations R,B along with their adjacency
matricesR,B. The cyclic decision process of each individual agents is described by the
respective Boyd (OODA) cycle as described in Kuramoto equations (1). In the game,
the players Blue and Red decide on their lead/lag targets φ ∈ [0, π] and ψ ∈ [0, π],
respectively. The outcome of the player decisions are captured by the pair of utility
functions UB(φ, ψ) and UR(φ, ψ), which will be defined later. The resulting game is
formally defined by the tuple G :=< P, (φ, ψ), (UB , UR) >.
In this game, once the players decide on their respective targets φ and ψ, the Boyd-
Kuramoto model (1) is computed numerically over a fixed time-horizon. It is important
to note that the equations may not converge to a point or even a limit cycle in certain
cases, and may exhibit chaotic behaviour. To capture the existence or the lack of internal
phase locking in agent populations, the order parameters in (5) are used. IfOB orOR is
larger than a threshold value, e.g. 0.9, then an approximate internal phase lock is said to
be achieved [8], which is consistent with numerical observations of phase trajectories.
Once the players have internal phase locking, then the difference (4) between centroids
(3) becomes time-invariant and meaningful. Note that, if there is no internal phase lock-
ing even for one player (population), then the phases of agents of that population are
time-varying. In that case, it is impossible to talk about a meaningful phase difference
∆ between the Red and Blue centroids.










−(−∆(T )− ψ)2 , if OB(T ) > 0.9, OR(T ) > 0.9
−100 , otherwise
(7)
Here, T denotes the finite time horizon over which the Boyd-Kuramoto model (1) is
solved numerically, and OB(T ) and OR(T ) are calculated using Kuramoto model av-
erage results over [T/4, T ]. The value −100 is chosen as a large negative value to
express undesirability of outcomes when OB(T ) < 0.9 or OR(T ) < 0.9, i.e. there is
no tangible internal phase locking in Blue or Red player agent populations.
Definition 1. A specific Boyd-Kuramoto Game G is played between the two adversarial
Players P := {Red,Blue}. Each player represents a set of networked agent popula-
tions with their decision cycles described by the Boyd-Kuramoto model in (1), which
is computed over the time horizon [0, T ]. The players Blue and Red decide on their
lead/lag targets φ ∈ [0, π] and ψ ∈ [0, π]. The outcome of the player decisions are
captured by the pair of utility functions UB(φ, ψ) and UR(φ, ψ) given in (6) and (7),
respectively. Then, the game is defined by the tuple G :=< P, (φ, ψ), (UB , UR) >
The Nash Equilibrium (NE) is used in this paper as the main game solution concept.
A Nash Equilibrium is formally defined as the set of player strategies and associated
utilities, where no player can gain by deviating from the NE when all other players
play their own NE strategies. It corresponds to a fixed point as well as the intersection
point of the best responses of players [3]. It is worth noting that bi-matrix games always
have a solution in mixed strategies, corresponding to a probability distribution over the
actions (pure strategies) [3].
4 Numerical Analysis of the Boyd-Kuramoto Game
4.1 Properties of the Underlying Boyd-Kuramoto Model
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psi 0.000 pi, phi 0.829 pi
(a) (ψ, φ) = (0, 0.829π)
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psi 0.000 pi, phi 0.914 pi
(b) (ψ, φ) = (0, 0.914π)
Fig. 2: Plots of ∆ and Order for values approaching instability.
Prior to discussing the specific game results, some considerations on the Kuramoto
model dynamics are offered. Depending on the pair of values (ψ, φ), the Kuramoto
model presents stable, oscillatory, or chaotic behaviour. An illustrated example of this
behaviour around the values (ψ, φ) = (0, 0.95π) is depicted in Figures 2 and 3 using
networks, frequency and coupling choices as given in [8].
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psi 0.000 pi, phi 0.943 pi
(a) (ψ, φ) = (0, 0.943π)
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psi 0.000 pi, phi 0.971 pi
(b) (ψ, φ) = (0, 0.971π)
Fig. 3: Plots of ∆ and the Order Parameter for oscillatory/unstable values.
For the parameters in the baseline scenario, the Order Parameter values of the Blue
Player are close to full synchronisation, OR ≈ 1, across all the values of (ψ, φ) (not
illustrated), while the Red Player Order Parameter values are close to synchronisation
only in the corner regions of (ψ, φ), close to (0, 0) or (π, π) as illustrated in Figure 4(a).
Figure 4(b) shows the variance of OR and highlights the (ψ, φ) regions where the sys-
tem exhibits oscillatory or unstable behaviours as studied in [8]. We observe that the
region of (ψ, φ) where the system presents an increased oscillatory behaviour coin-
cides with the region where the Red Order Parameter OR is at a minimum and well
below the threshold 0.9 that is penalised in the utility functions of players, UB(φ, ψ)
and UR(φ, ψ). It constitutes, therefore, a region that both players will tend to avoid in
the game.


















(a) Time average of OR



















(b) Variance of OR
Fig. 4: Red Player Order values and their variance for (ψ, φ) ∈





4.2 Nash Equilibrium Solution in Baseline Scenario
As a baseline scenario for the numerical analysis of the game defined in the previous
section, the following parameters have been selected in continuity with the previous
studies [6]:
– The Blue network has 21 nodes in a complete 4-ary Tree configuration and the Red
network has the same number of (21) randomly connected nodes.
– The interaction network involves the leaves of the Blue Tree (Nodes 6-21) linked
to the correspondingly labelled nodes of the random Red network.
– The natural frequencies ω and ν are randomly chosen from a [0, 1] interval with an
average of 0.551329 for the Red agents and 0.503192 for the Blues.
– The coupling constants are ζR = 0.5 for Red and ζB = 8 for Blue, and the cross-
coupling constants are ζBR = ζRB = 0.4.
The action spaces of the players are discretised to obtain a bi-matrix game. Specifically,
each player has 36 strategies available, i.e. the player’s respective phase lag targets φ and
ψ are discretised in uniform 36 bins of size π/36 within the interval {0, π}. The number
36 is chosen for its divisibility and taking into account computational constraints.
The Kuramoto model (1) is solved for every pair of
(ψ, φ) ∈ {0, π
36
, . . . ,
nπ
36




The utility functions UB(φ, ψ) and UR(φ, ψ) are calculated accordingly using (6) and
(7), and provide the entries of the respective utility matrices (Figure 5).
Even though the Boyd-Kuramoto model shows complex dynamic behaviour (as dis-
cussed above) depending on the desired phase lags (ψ, φ), the associated static 2-Player
nonzero-sum strategic (non-cooperative) game as formulated in Section 3 admits a pure
strategy Nash Equilibrium that is mostly insensitive to the model parameters, except the
intrinsic frequencies ωi and νj of the Blue and Red populations.

















(a) Red Utility Matrix

















(b) Blue Utility Matrix
Fig. 5: Red and Blue player utilities in the baseline scenario.
For the baseline set of parameters, the player utilities are illustrated in Figure 5.
The game admits then a single pure-strategy Nash Equilibrium as shown in Table 1(a).
To interpret this result, we first need to appreciate that the maximum reachable utility
for a player is equal to zero, that is when the difference (4) between centroids (3) of
the system is exactly equal to the desired phase for the player. The calculated NE is
therefore stating that the Red player could enforce a very slight phase advantage to the
player Blue. In order to increase the resolution of the game discretisation in the area of
the utility matrices where the NE emerges, a new simulation has been executed with the






4 }. The results, shown in Table
1(b), confirm that Red player can actually enforce a slight lag of π20 to the Blue player
and gains an advantage at the unique NE of the game. It is also worth noting that this
NE solution is at the same time a Dominant Strategy Equilibrium and the game does
not admit any other mixed strategy equilibrium solution.
5 Analytic Study of the Game Solution
In [8], the stability properties of the Boyd-Kuramoto model were studied, where it
was identified that the fixed point of the dynamical system only depends on the cross-
coupling strengths and connectivity between Blue and Red, and the native frequencies
of the agents. The sensitivity analysis conducted next in Section 6 indicates that the NE
also depends mainly on these parameters, and is relatively insensitive to the network
structures and internal couplings of the Blue and Red populations. This suggests an
analytic study of the NE is feasible through approximation.
Player Strategy Payoff
Red ψ = 2π
36
−0.00033
Blue φ = 0 −0.02598
(a) NE strategy
Player Strategy Payoff
Red ψ = 1π
20
0
Blue φ = 0 −0.02784
(b) Refined NE
Table 1: Nash Equilibrium strategies of players with refinement (zoom-in at location)
in the baseline scenario.
Using the derivation further elaborated in [6], the expression for∆may be explicitly
computed in the limit where Blue and Red achieve high internal synchronisation, i.e.
the origin, as indeed occurs in the region of the observed NE (φ∗, ψ∗) = (0, π20 ) here.
Using the analysis from [8] and [6], we obtain
























µ = ω̄ − ν̄, (12)
where ∆ was defined in (4), d(BR)T is the number of links between Blue and Red, and
ω̄, ν̄ are the mean intrinsic frequencies within the Blue and Red populations. From the
baseline scenario chosen in Section 4, d(BR)T = 16, µ = −0.048.
Substituting the expression above for ∆ in the utility functions for Blue and Red,
given in (6), (7), and the parameter choices from Section 4 results in an approximation
of player utilities in the stable region, and is shown in Figure 6. The figure also depicts
the unconstrained best responses of the players superimposed as lines corresponding to
∂UB/∂φ = ∂UR/∂ψ = 0, and the numerically obtained unique NE in the baseline
scenario. As expected, the NE sits on the line of optima for Red at the edge of the fea-
sible region for Blue, namely φ = 0. Moreover, any increase of φ results in decreasing
utility - confirming that Blue cannot improve their outcome. The utility functions of the
players at the NE solution are further depicted in Figure 7.
In the region around the origin where the Boyd-Kuramoto dynamics are stable, the
expression for ∆ given in (8) can be linearised with respect to φ and ψ around the point
(0, 0). In fact, expanding the derivatives ∂UB/∂φ, ∂UR/∂ψ and extracting the roots of
∂UB/∂φ = 0 = ∂UR/∂ψ leads to the following closed form solution for the Nash
(a) Utility functions of Blue and Red Players around the origin.
(b) Utility functions over the decision region (positive quadrant) near origin.
Fig. 6: Utility functions of Blue and Red Players calculated using the ∆ expression in
(8). The superimposed lines represent the best responses of the players and the black
point is the Nash equilibrium.
.








(a) Utility functions of Blue and Red Players at ψ = π/20.








(b) Utility functions of Blue and Red Players at φ = 0.
Fig. 7: Utility functions of Blue and Red Players calculated using the ∆ expression in
(8) at the Nash Equilibrium, (φ∗, ψ∗) = (0, π20 ) .
.
equilibrium:
φ∗ = 0, ψ∗ = −
(ζBR + ζRB)
√








d2T (ζBR + ζRB)







With the respective parameter values inserted the non-zero phase evaluates to ψ∗ =
0.156688, consistent with the previously obtained numerical result, π/20. This analyt-
ical expression of the NE allows us to observe that the critical factor in generating the
asymmetry between Blue and Red is µ, the difference between mean frequencies in the
two populations.
6 Sensitivity Analysis of the Boyd-Kuramoto Game
The Boyd-Kuramoto Game defined in Section 3 is further analysed numerically in order
to gain insights into the solutions as well as their sensitivity to the underlying game
parameters. The underlying Boyd-Kuramoto model naturally plays a significant role in
the game outcomes. Therefore, four additional scenarios have been explored changing
one parameter at a time from the baseline scenario in Section 4. Specifically,
2. Scenario decreases the blue coupling constant (ζB) from 8 to 2 to ”loosen” the
coupling of the ordered network.
3. Scenario modifies the red network, from random to ”hierarchic” (quasi 4-ary ma-
trix).
4. Scenario swaps the natural frequencies ω, ν of the Blue and Red player agent pop-
ulations.
5. Scenario increases the average natural frequency gap between the Blue and Red
populations.
6.1 Scenario 2 - Smaller Blue Player Coupling Constant
The blue coupling constant ζB is decreased to 2 from 8 where all the other parameters
remain identical to the baseline scenario. Lowering the blue coupling constant should
loosen the tightness of the blue network. In this scenario, the same Nash Equilibrium
strategies as the baseline scenario are obtained (Table 2) with a slightly better pay-off
for the Red player and worse for the Blue. A possible interpretation is that the red player
can enforce slightly more easily the phase gap to a less rigid blue network. It is to be
noted that in this scenario, the dynamics of the Boyd-Kuramoto model are very similar
to the baseline scenario in terms of pattern and oscillatory behaviour.
6.2 Scenario 3 - Hierarchical Red Network
The network matrix of Red player is modified from random to a hierarchical similar
to the one of the Blue player and all other parameters are reset to the baseline. In this
scenario, the same Nash Equilibrium as per the baseline scenario is obtained (Table
Player Strategy Payoff
Red ψ = 2π
36
−0.00001
Blue φ = 0 −0.03018
Table 2: NE in Scenario 2 with a smaller blue coupling constant of ζB = 2.
3) with comparable player pay-offs. Apparently, with the selected utility function, the
structure of the player’s network has a very limited influence on the Nash Equilibrium
of the game. This can be attributed to the static nature of the game and the underlying
time-scale separation between the Kuramoto model dynamics and game formulation. In
other words, the game uses an averaged outcome of the Kuramoto model, and hence, the
influence of the player networks on the game outcomes diminishes. Note that, similar to
Scenario 2, the dynamics of the Boyd-Kuramoto model are very similar to the baseline
scenario in terms of pattern and oscillatory behaviour.
Player Strategy Payoff
Red ψ = 2π
36
−0.00011
Blue φ = 0 −0.02846
Table 3: NE in Scenario 3 with hierarchical Red network
6.3 Scenario 4 - Swapping Red and Blue Player Population’s Natural
Frequencies
The natural frequencies of Blue player population ω are swapped with those of the
Red player population ν in order to investigate the impact of natural frequencies on
game outcomes. In the baseline scenario, those frequencies are not symmetric and ran-
domly selected from an interval [0, 1] with different means: mean(ω) = 0.5032 and
mean(ν) = 0.5513. The natural frequencies can be interpreted as an input to the Ku-
ramoto system (1).
As a first observation after solving the Boyd-Kuramoto model for this scenario, we
realise that the the system dynamics are significantly influenced by the change. While
the blue orders are still close to full synchronisation (OR ≈ 1) across all the values
of (ψ, φ) (not illustrated) and the red orders are still close to synchronisation only in
the corner regions, we note that the region of (ψ, φ) for which the system presents
oscillatory or unstable properties is displaced compared to the anti-diagonal and with
a significant increase of variance all around the anti-diagonal as illustrated in Figure
8 compared to the baseline scenario (Figure 4). Figure 9 shows the utilities for Red
and Blue players, which also reflects similar displacement compared to the baseline
scenario (Figure 5).




















(a) Time average of OR



















(b) Variance of OR











































Fig. 9: Red and Blue player utility matrices with swapped natural frequencies.
As an important second observation, when solving the game for Nash Equilibrium
in this scenario, we note an inversion of winner in the game as illustrated in Table 4. The
calculated Nash Equilibrium shows now the Blue player being able to enforce on the
Red player a small phase gap of 3π36 with a symmetric pay-off compared to the baseline
scenario. Considering that the swap of frequencies between blue and red is actually
reversing the asymmetry of frequencies between players, it appears that the asymmetry
of the natural frequencies is playing an important role. Specifically, the ’faster’ player
in average can enforce a small phase lag to the ’slower’ player.
Player Strategy Payoff
Red ψ = 0 −0.06512
Blue φ = 3π
36
−0.00019
Table 4: Nash Equilibrium - scenario 4 - swapped frequencies
6.4 Scenario 5 - Increased Natural Frequency Gap between Players
In this scenario, the original frequency gap between red and blue player is doubled by
maintaining the original blue frequencies as per baselinemean(ωi) = 0.5032 and shift-
ing the red frequencies further so that mean(νj) = 0.5994 from 0.5513 as per baseline
value. Similar to the previous scenario, we observe that the system dynamic is signifi-
cantly influenced by that change. The blue orders are still close to full synchronisation
(OR ≈ 1) across all the values of (ψ, φ) (not illustrated) and the red orders are still
close to synchronisation only in the corner regions. We note that the region of (ψ, φ),
for which the system presents oscillatory or unstable properties, shows a significant
increase in variance all around the anti-diagonal as illustrated in Figure 10, when com-
pared to the baseline scenario in Figure 4. Solving the game for Nash Equilibrium, we
observe that the increase of Red player natural frequency allows it to slightly increase
the imposed phase lag to 3π36 compared to
2π
36 of the baseline scenario (Table 5).
Player Strategy Payoff
Red ψ = 3π
36
−0.00049
Blue φ = 0 −0.11346
Table 5: Nash Equilibrium in Scenario 5 with increased gap of frequencies




















(a) Time average of OR




















(b) Variance of OR
Fig. 10: Red Orders and their variance in Scenario 5.
.
7 Conclusion
The initial results in this paper show that combining a game-theoretic approach with
the Boyd-Kuramoto model is a fertile research direction for better understanding of
strategic decisions in complex and competitive/adversarial systems.
The Boyd-Kuramoto Game studied as a baseline scenario in this report admits a
unique pure Nash Equilibrium solution that has interesting implications. The subse-
quent sensitivity analysis provides additional insights. It is observed numerically that
many parameters of the Kuramoto model affect the NE solution of the current game
formulation much less than initially stipulated. This is arguably due to the time-scale
separation between the underlying Kuramoto model and the static game built on top of
it. While these parameters play an important role in the Boyd-Kuramoto dynamics, they
do not directly affect (stable) stationary outputs. We expect this situation may change in
dynamic game formulations, which may encourage more dynamic decisions than for-
mulated in this paper. In terms of the dynamical system, it means that the behaviour
of fluctuations - which are known to depend sensitively on the network structures [6] -
will have an impact on the game dynamics. Numerical simulations also indicate that the
natural frequencies of the agents have a significant impact on NE outcomes of the game.
Again, this can be attributed to the fact that the natural frequencies have a direct impact
on the underlying Kuramoto model’s stationary solutions. From a decision-making per-
spective, this may be interpreted as investment in individual agents may pay-off more
in certain cases than their organisational properties. All of these hypotheses are sup-
ported by the analytic solution obtained by linearisation around the origin. The analysis
makes it explicitly clear that the static game outcomes depend on the cross-couplings
and numbers of connections, and the asymmetry between mean frequencies in the two
adversary populations.
There are multiple potentially promising future directions including investigation
of different utility functions and dynamic game formulations that allow the players to
change their decisions during the evolution of the underlying Boyd-Kuramoto models.
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